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The 2001 Nevada Redistricting and Perpetuation of the Status Quo 
 
 
David F. Damore 
 
 Between 1990 and 2000 the population of Nevada increased by over 66 percent. Much of this 
growth was fueled by an influx of minorities and further concentrated the states population in 
southern Nevada. These forces altered the states political landscape and raised the stakes for the 
decennial redistricting of Nevadas assembly and senate seats. Employing a multi-methodological 
approach, this effort demonstrates how the 2001 Nevada redistricting maintained the pre-existing 
partisan divisions in the state legislature despite a number of factors that threatened to alter the status 
quo. At the same time, the analysis reveals that the desire of key redistricters to maintain the partisan 
status quo compromised the typical byproduct that results from bipartisan gerrymanders, incumbent 
protection. 
 
 The unprecedented growth experienced in Nevada during the 1990s and 
the further concentration of the states population in southern Nevada pro-
vided an opportunity for the 2001 redistricting to alter the existing distribu-
tion of power in the state legislature. However, after the 2002 state legisla-
tive elections, the status quo prevailed with the Democrats maintaining con-
trol of the states lower chamber and the Republicans holding their majority 
in the upper house. Moreover, the partisan divisions in both chambers were 
virtually unchanged even though the direct and indirect effects of redistrict-
ing left over a third of the seats contested in the November 2002 elections 
without an incumbent. 
 Against this backdrop, this effort investigates how Nevada redistricters 
were able to maintain the status quo in the Nevada legislature despite the 
presence of numerous forces working against such an outcome. Specifically, 
drawing on insights offered by prior research and employing a multi-
methodological approach (e.g., game theoretic precepts and descriptive and 
quantitative analysis), the paper examines how partisan control of the state 
senate and assembly was preserved; how partisan considerations undermined 
incumbency protection; and how these considerations affected the 2002 state 
legislative elections. 
 The paper is organized as follows. After a review of prior research and 
a discussion of the context in which the 2001 Nevada redistricting took 
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place, a game theoretic set-up is used to analyze the affect that a number of 
formal and informal constraints exerted on redistricting negotiations and 
how redistricters were able to overcome these obstacles to preserve the parti-
san status quo. Next, data taken from the redistricting process is used to 
examine the consequences that the shifting of legislative seats from northern 
to southern Nevada had for incumbent protection. These data are then com-
bined with data from the 2002 state legislative elections to assess how redis-
tricting affected electoral outcomes in 2002. The paper concludes by inte-
grating the papers findings into the broader literature. 
 
Prior Research 
 
 The politics of redistricting have received ample attention in the litera-
ture and without equivocation this research suggests that redistricting 
matters in that it affects the behavior of voters and legislators and influences 
electoral and policy outcomes (Rush 1993). In seeking to understand the 
particulars of redistricting, prior research has largely focused on how the 
process is used for partisan advantage and/or incumbent protection and the 
effect these considerations have for legislative responsiveness and partisan 
bias.1 
 The work of Gelman and King (1994) provide a useful starting point 
for assessing these dynamics. They suggest that redistricting is characterized 
by conflict and uncertainty that bring the goals of parties, who desire an 
increase in the number of seats held by their party, and incumbents, who are 
primarily concerned with insulating themselves from electoral challenges, 
into conflict.2 From their perspective, the key to understanding redistricting 
is assessing the influence that formal and informal constraints exert on the 
ability of redistricters to navigate the tension between these goals. To this 
end, they contend that most plans result in compromises that weight the 
political partys overall seat advantage most heavily (542). 
 At the same time, other scholars suggest that the ability of parties to use 
the redistricting process to enhance their electoral prospects is hindered by a 
number of considerations. First, partisan plans are constrained by existing 
boundary lines, the requirements of equal size, compactness and contiguity, 
the need to insure representation of communities of interest, and the prefer-
ences of incumbents (see note two). In addition, the ability to implement 
partisan gerrymanders is hindered by the existing partisan composition of 
the state government. As the work of Cain (1985), Cox and Katz (1999), 
McDonald (2004) and others suggest, parties are only able to implement 
such plans when they control redistricting institutions. In contexts where 
partisan control is split the typical outcome is a bipartisan compromise that 
favors incumbent protection. 
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 Moreover, longitudinal analyses indicate that partisan advantages tend 
to dissipate over time (e.g., Cain 1985; Squire 1985; Basehart and Comer 
1991) because partisan gerrymanders require the majority party to spread its 
voters as efficiently over as many districts as possible. This, in turn, in-
creases the risk that controlling parties may cut their advantages too thin and 
increase the vulnerability of formally safe incumbents (Cain 1985). As a 
consequence, partisan gerrymanders may be undermined by small shifts in 
district constituencies (Gopian and West 1984) or by short-term influences. 
 The literature largely has examined the consequences of redistricting in 
terms of partisan bias (the degree to which seat distributions reflect aggre-
gate vote totals) and legislative responsiveness (how the partisan compo-
sition of a legislature responds to shifts in voters preferences). Here, the 
literature (e.g., Cain 1985; Gelman and King 1994; Cox and Katz 1999) 
suggests that both bias and responsiveness are affected by the efficiency by 
which voters are distributed across districts. 
 As noted above, when a controlling party seeks to implement a partisan 
gerrymander, its incumbents must forego some protection so that the party 
can distribute its voters so as to maximize its likelihood of winning the most 
number of seats (Cain 1985). Plans of this type more efficiently distribute 
the controlling partys voters, while decreasing the efficiency of the non-
controlling partys voters (who are packed into a smaller number of safe 
seats). The net result is more marginal districts that, all else equal, are sensi-
tive to fluctuations in voters preference (Cain 1985).3 Conversely, when 
partisan control over redistricting is split it is unlikely that either party will 
gain an advantage because doing so would require the consent of the opposi-
tion. As a consequence, these plans inefficiently distribute voters of both 
parties by creating a large number of uncompetitive seats (Cox and Katz 
1999). The end result is a decrease in legislative responsiveness (Cain 1985; 
Cox and Katz 1999). 
 Not surprisingly, past research indicates that partisan gerrymanders 
increase the potential for partisan bias (Gelman and King 1994; Cox and 
Katz 1999). The literature assessing the consequences of bias under bi-
partisan plans, however, is less clear. For instance, Cox and Katz (1999) 
suggest that the level of bias in such plans is affected by the parties assump-
tions about the relative share of the vote they expect to win and the nature of 
the court action that may result from a redistricting challenge. Analyses of 
bipartisan redistricting plans of state legislatures in the 1970s and 1980s 
(e.g., Squire 1985; Niemi and Jackson 1991) find no systematic evidence of 
bias. 
 The work of Gelman and King (1994) take a slightly different posi-
tion on these issues. Specifically, they argue that because of the competing 
goals of the key actors and the uncertain and conflictual context in which 
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redistricting transpires, regardless of the shape of the plan, the net result is a 
significant shaking-up of the political environment. This tumult, in turn, 
tends to facilitate political renewal that may reduce partisan bias and in-
crease responsiveness. 
 
The Nevada Context 
 
Formal and Informal Constraints 
 
 As is demonstrated below, many of these considerations as well as a 
number of formal and informal constraints unique to the Nevada context 
affected the 2001 Nevada redistricting. Perhaps the most important of these 
considerations was the 66.3 percent increase in the states population during 
the 1990s. The majority of this growth occurred in southern Nevada (e.g., 
Clark County), which saw its population increase by over 85 percent 
between 1990 and 2000. Today, Clark County is home to nearly seven out of 
10 Nevadans. 
 Of course, the presence of dramatic and asymmetrical growth does not 
necessitate a threat to the existing distribution of political power. Rather, for 
this expectation to have merit the preferences of the states new inhabitants 
must differ from those of pre-existing residents. Unfortunately, the data 
needed to evaluate this claim (e.g., a comparison of the voter registration of 
new residents to those of existing residents) are not available. Evidence in 
support of this point can be gleaned from inspection of the two party vote 
distribution in the four most salient statewide races prior to the 2001 redis-
tricting.4 The results of these races indicate that the vote distribution in 
Nevada is anything but symmetrical as Democratic candidates receive any-
where from 11 to 27 percent more of the vote in Clark County as compared 
to elsewhere in the state. Thus, given the surge in southern Nevadas popula-
tion and the disparity in voting patterns between southern Nevada and the 
rest of the state, the 2001 redistricting provided an opportunity to alter exist-
ing power in the state legislature in a manner beneficial to the states Demo-
crats. 
 A second constraint on the process was accommodating representation 
for Nevadas burgeoning Hispanic population (Nevada Legislative Counsel 
Bureau 2001). Indeed, much of the states growth in the 1990s was fueled by 
an influx of Hispanics. Whereas Hispanics constituted just over 10 percent 
of the population in 1990, by 2000 Hispanics accounted for slightly less than 
20 percent of the population with 75 percent of the states Hispanic popula-
tion residing in Clark County. 
 A successful redistricting plan also needed to navigate a number of 
structural constraints. Most notably, redistricters had to contend with the 
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existing divisions within the state legislature.5 Moreover, while the Nevada 
Constitution delegates near autonomy over redistricting to the state legisla-
ture (the governor may veto a plan), if the legislature is unable to reach an 
agreement, then the judiciary could intervene. From the perspective of redis-
tricters, judicial involvement would be problematic because any intervention 
would be discretionary (e.g., the courts could determine the conditions 
under which a reversionary plan would be used, as well as the nature of the 
reversion itself), as opposed to automatic (e.g., a prespecified plan that 
would be implemented by a prespecified condition) (Cox and Katz 1999). 
 At the same time, three peculiarities to the process in Nevada provided 
redistricters with latitude in crafting the final plan. First, the Nevada Consti-
tution allows the size of the legislature to be expanded beyond its present 63 
members. Second, Nevada does not require the contiguousness of assembly 
seats within senate districts. That is, while senate seats have twice the popu-
lation of assembly seats, two assembly seats are not required to correspond 
to the boundaries of one senate seat. Rather, senate seats can be drawn 
irrespective of the boundaries of the underlying assembly districts. Lastly, 
Nevada allows for the creation of two-member districts in the state senate. 
These districts contain twice as many citizens and are represented by two 
members who compete in alternating elections. 
 
Key Players and Interests 
 
 As specified by the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau (2001), the 
goal of the 2001 Nevada redistricting was to redraw legislative boundaries to 
reflect changes in the states population and provide representation for the 
states Hispanic community. In raw political terms, redistricting would 
determine partisan control of the states legislative chambers, as well as 
which incumbents would be protected. Two side payments also were linked 
to the state legislative redistricting: the level of funding for Nevada State 
College at Henderson, the pet project of Assembly Speaker Richard Per-
kins, and the drawing of the boundaries for the states newly apportioned 
House seat. 
 The key actors in the 2001 redistricting in Nevada were Assembly 
Speaker Perkins and Senate Majority Leader Bill Raggio. The interests of 
the two players capture the prevailing cleavages in Nevada politics. Whereas 
Perkins is a Democrat and leader of the legislatures lower chamber, Raggio 
is Republican and controls the upper house. Perkins comes from urban, 
Clark County in southern Nevada, while Raggio is the legislatures dominant 
voice for northern and rural interests. As a consequence and to the chagrin of 
many rank and file members, Perkins and Raggio acted as the de facto nego-
tiators for their respective parties, chambers, and geographic interests. 
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 As noted above, the ability of redistricters to use the process to their 
advantage is limited by formal and informal constraints (e.g., Gelman and 
King 1994). In the case of Nevada, the states population growth and in-
creased concentration in southern Nevada provided Perkins with an advan-
tage. Regardless of the outcome, southern Nevada would gain seats. The 
collective preferences of the citizens, however, worked to Raggios advan-
tage. Although the state is evenly split in terms of Republican and Demo-
cratic registration, Republicans win most statewide races and in the 
aggregate, outpoll Democrats in state legislative races. 
 At the outset of negotiations, the affect of the other constraints outlined 
above was unclear. On the one hand, the divided control of the Nevada 
legislature could facilitate a stalemate. At the same time, the uncertainty 
associated with judicial intervention if an agreement could not be reached 
created an incentive for the players to reach a compromise (Cox and Katz 
1999).6 Lastly, the peculiarities of Nevadas redistricting institutions (e.g., 
the non-contiguity of assembly and senate districts, multi-member senate 
districts, and the ability to alter the size of the legislature) provided redis-
tricters with flexibility in drawing senate and assembly seats. At the same 
time, these considerations increased uncertainty about the contours of the 
final plan. 
 
Partisan Protection 
 
 Game theoretic precepts are used examine the affect that partisan con-
siderations had on redistricting negotiations.7 Specifically, the process is 
conceptualized as a two player mixed-motive game.8 Such an approach 
assumes that players behavior is shaped by competitive and complimentary 
considerations and allows side payments to factor into players decision 
making.9 In the context of interest here, the players had complimentary goals 
in passing a plan that would not solicit judicial intervention and competing 
interests in passing a plan that would reflect their preferences. 
 Thus, given the preferences of the redistricting architects and the in-
formal and formal constraints outlined above, six potential outcomes may 
have resulted from redistricting negotiations: maintenance of the partisan 
status quo of either an expanded or non-expanded legislature or unified 
Republican or Democratic control of either an expanded or non-expanded 
legislature. Table 1 summarizes these outcomes and the preference orderings 
of the players over the partisan and expansion. 
 The players preferences over the partisan dimension are straight-
forward. Both Perkins and Raggio ideal outcomes would be a legislature 
controlled by Democrats and Republicans respectively. The players prefer-
ences over the expansion issue, however, require elaboration. In supporting a  
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Table 1. Potential Outcomes for 2001 Nevada Redistricting 
and Preference Orderings of Legislative Leaders 
 
 
 Perkins Raggio 
Outcome Preference Ranking Preference Ranking 
 
 
A.  Democratic control of legislature. 1 6 
B.  Democratic control of expanded legislature. 2 5 
C.  Partisan status quo. 3 4 
D.  Partisan status quo, expanded legislature. 4 3 
E.  Republican control of legislature. 5 2 
F.  Republican control of expanded legislature. 6 1 
 
 
 
six seat expansion of the legislature, Raggio argued that doing so would 
allow the seats of northern incumbents to be preserved and allow more man-
ageable sized districts to be drawn for rural legislators (Morrison 2001b). 
Conversely, even though Clark County would receive 69 percent of the seats 
under both an expanded and non-expanded legislature, Perkins was against 
expansion. He believed that southern Nevada would be better served by 
concentrating power in fewer hands (Morrison 2001b). 
 Not surprisingly, the players initially put forth plans that would maxi-
mize their preferences: Perkins and the Democrats presented a plan that 
would facilitate outcome A, a non-expanded legislature where both 
chambers were likely to be controlled by the Democrats, while Raggio and 
the GOP countered with a plan that would likely lead to outcome F, an 
expanded legislature with unified Republican control.10 However, neither of 
these outcomes nor outcomes B and E were feasible because they would 
require a chamber majority to vote against its interest. 
 As a consequence, a second iteration of the game was played with the 
feasible set of outcomes reduced to either outcome C, perpetuation of the 
partisan status quo (a win for Perkins) or outcome D, perpetuation of the 
partisan status quo in an expanded legislature (a win for Raggio). The initial 
compromise between the leaders resulted in outcome D, a win for Raggio 
because he would preserve his chamber majority and be able to protect 
northern incumbents.11 However, because of concerns about the pro-GOP 
nature of the drawing of the states new House seat, the deal fell apart, 
necessitating an additional iteration of the game. In nixing the deal, Perkins 
argued that I still have no desire to grow this legislature, so if its going to 
happen, I have to benefit somehow, and weve seen no benefit (Morrison 
2001c). 
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 The inability to sustain the agreement over outcome D illustrates the 
difficulty of obtaining a stable outcome in a mixed-motive setting. Because 
the players payoffs are variable and therefore, the motives underlying their 
actions differ, each player is responding to a disparate mix of competitive 
and complimentary incentives. Raggio had more to lose and hence more to 
protect, while Perkins would gain with either outcome C or D because ir-
respective of the size of the legislature southern Nevada would gain seats. 
These asymmetries in payoffs did not allow the agreement for outcome D to 
be sustained because to do so would have required Perkins to either adjust 
his perceptions of the payoffs or alter his incentives to coordinate his actions 
with Raggios. 
 In the third round of play, which transpired under the drama of a 
special session, Raggio dropped his demand for an expanded legislature.12 In 
so doing, Raggio altered his and Perkins perceptions of the game. Whereas 
Perkins continued to see the game as a variable sum game, Raggio was faced 
with a situation that resembled a zero sum game: whatever he lost, Perkins 
would gain. This shift, in turn, caused Raggio to support outcome C, which 
maximized Perkins minimum gain while minimizing Raggios maximum 
loss. In addition, both players received their side payments with Raggio 
benefiting from a pro-Republican drawing of the new House seat and 
Perkins gaining funding for the states new college. 
 While the game theoretic analysis is useful for understanding the broad 
contours of the 2001 Nevada redistricting, it fails to reveal the specifics by 
which the partisan status quo was maintained. To better understand these 
dynamics Table 2 summarizes the distribution of seats in terms of the per-
cent difference in Democratic and Republican voter registration. In the 
assembly, seats range from +41.69% Democrat to +30.25% Republican. In 
the senate, seats range from +40.53% Democrat to +19% Republican. 
 As such, these data suggest two important conclusions. First, because 
partisan packing was the means by which outcome C was realized, it appears 
that there is little opportunity for the minority party to gain control of either 
chamber. This is most obvious in the senate where Democratic seats all have 
values greater than 10 percent and no seats were drawn with slight Demo-
cratic advantages. Of the three senate seats that might be considered com-
petitive (those in the zero to +5% Republican column), two of those seats are 
in two-member districts, which as discussed below insulate incumbents from 
serious opposition. In the assembly, the Democrats were drawn 21 safe seats 
and the Republicans 12, leaving only nine seats (those in the zero to 5% 
Democrat and 0 to 5% Republican columns) marginally competitive. 
 Second, by focusing attention on maintaining the partisan status quo, 
the plan provided little opportunity for Hispanics to gain a foothold in state 
politics.  Despite  energetic  lobbying on behalf of  Hispanic  interests  and  a  
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Table 2. Partisan Difference in Voter Registration 
for Redistricted Assembly and Senate Seats 
 
 
  +10.1 +5.1 0 to 0 to +5.1 +10.1  
 >+15.1% to 15% to 10% +5% +5% to 10% to 15% >+15.1% 
 Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep 
 
 
Assembly (n = 42) 
 9 4 8 5 4 0 5 7 
 
Senate (n = 21) 
 5 4 0 0 3 4 3 2 
 
Note:  Data taken from Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau Redistricting Reports. 
 
 
 
directive by the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau (2001) that the plan 
provide representation for Hispanics, only two assembly and one senate seat 
were drawn with Hispanic populations greater that 60 percent and only one 
of these seats was drawn as open. Exactly why this occurred was the source 
of a good deal of post hoc finger pointing between Republicans and Demo-
crats. The likely culprit, however, was the Hispanics who by courting both 
parties in hopes of getting the best deal failed to solidify their efforts behind 
a single plan. As Ryan Erwin, a Republican operative involved in the pro-
cess explained, the Hispanics organized well, but they werent good at 
decision making (Morrison 2001e). 
 
Incumbent Protection 
 
 As detailed above, the 2001 Nevada redistricting maintained the parti-
san status quo via a bipartisan gerrymander. However, because of uneven 
growth patterns during the prior decade and the decision of redistricters to 
maintain the size of the legislature, the plan necessitated the movement of 
seats from northern to southern Nevada. Specifically, three assembly and 
one senate seat were moved from northern to southern Nevada. The plan 
also created six open seats in the assembly and one in the senate. The prac-
tical consequence of this decision was that incumbent protection, the typical 
byproduct of bipartisan gerrymanders, was compromised as the plan dis-
located six assembly incumbents and one senate incumbent.13
 The asymmetry in the ability of redistricters to protect senate and 
assembly incumbents demonstrates the importance of the peculiarities of 
Nevadas redistricting institutions (e.g., multi-member districting and non-
contiguousness between assembly and senate seats) for protecting senate 
 
158  |  David F. Damore 
incumbents. For those senate incumbents who are drawn into multi-member 
districts they are effectively insulated from serious electoral challenges be-
cause any challenger would be required to compete for the support of twice 
as many voters in districts that are already drawn in favor of the incumbents 
party. Multi-member districts also provide collective benefits for all senate 
incumbents because the creation of two two-member senate districts requires 
a 19 way, as opposed to 21 way, division of the electorate. This, coupled 
with the lack of a requirement that the boundaries for senate seats corre-
spond to the underlying assembly districts, allows the preferences of senate 
incumbents to be easily accommodated. As a consequence, only one senate 
incumbent, a northern Nevada Republican lost his seat and was drawn into 
the district of another GOP incumbent. To offset the loss of the northern 
GOP seat, an open seat was created in southern Nevada with a partisan 
registration difference of +5.89 percent Republican. 
 The analysis presented in the top panel of Table 3 empirically demon-
strates these processes at work. Using data taken from the Nevada Legisla-
tive Counsel Bureaus Redistricting Reports, the table presents the analysis 
of variance and difference of means for the senate redistricting. The depen-
dent variable is the percent difference in Democratic and Republican voter 
registration in each senate seat and the independent variable is the partisan-
ship of the incumbent drawn into the district. Turning first to the overall 
performance of the model, the value of the F statistic indicates that the 
between group differences in the partisan composition of the three district 
types are statistically significant and the eta squared value suggests that over 
81 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by 
differences in the independent variable. As expected, difference of means 
tests for the three district types indicate that the partisan registration dif-
ference for the seats drawn for Democratic incumbents are significantly 
different from the open seat and the seats drawn for Republican incumbents. 
There is no significant difference in the partisan registration difference 
between the open seat and the Republican seats (as noted above, the open 
seat was drawn to offset the loss of a GOP seat in northern Nevada). 
 Thus, while the peculiarities of multi-member districting and the lack 
of contiguousness between senate and assembly seats allowed the senate to 
largely avoid dislocation of its incumbents, the same did not occur in the 
assembly. To balance the distribution of assembly seats with the growth in 
southern Nevada, the redistricting plan created six open seats in Clark 
County. To offset the creation of the new seats in southern Nevada, two sets 
of Democratic incumbents and two sets of Republican incumbents were 
drawn into the same districts and two districts were drawn with both Repub-
lican and Democratic incumbents.14
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Table 3. Analysis of Variance and Difference of Means Tests 
for 2001 Redistricting of the Nevada Legislature 
 
 
 Mean Number 
 Registration of 
Seat Type Difference Observations 
 
 
Senate 
 
A. Republican Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat B +10.38% Rep. 11 
B. Democratic Incumbent Drawn Into Seat A +20.45% Dem.   9 
C. Open Seat B   +5.89% Rep.   1 
 
F = 38.66, p<.001 
Eta-squared = .811 
 
Assembly 
 
A. Republican Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat B, C +15.02 Rep. 11 
B. Democratic Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat A +12.15 Dem. 23 
C. Open Seat A   +7.15 Dem.   6 
D. Republican and Democratic Incumbents  
 Drawn Into Seat +10.69 Dem.   2 
 
F = 10.50, p <.001 
Eta squared = .453 
 
Note:  Subscripts indicate statistically significant difference between group means, p<.001. level. 
 
 
 
 The bottom portion of Table 3, which presents the analysis of variance 
and difference of means for the assembly redistricting, captures these 
dynamics. Consistent with the results for the senate analysis, the F statistic 
indicates that the between group differences in the partisan composition of 
the four district types are statistically significant. The value of the eta 
squared statistic suggests that 45 percent of the variance in the partisan 
registration of the assembly districts is accounted for by the independent 
variable. The smaller eta square value for the assembly model reflects the 
weakened relationship between incumbent partisanship and constituent 
registration discussed above. Difference of means tests for the seat types 
indicate that the partisan registration difference for the seats drawn for 
Republican incumbents are significantly different from the open seats and 
the seats drawn for Democratic incumbents. The other differences of means 
are statistically insignificant suggesting no systematic differences between 
these seat types. 
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Redistricting and the 2002 Nevada Legislative Elections 
 
 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Gelman and King 1996; Kousser 
1996; Desposato and Petrocik 2003), the implementation of the 2001 redis-
tricting plan in Nevada had both direct and indirect effects on the subsequent 
legislative elections. The direct effects of redistricting, which are examined 
below, stem from the advantage that incumbents gain by competing in dis-
tricts that are packed with partisan. The indirect effects of redistricting result 
from the influence that new boundaries exert on incumbents assessments of 
their electoral futures. 
 To this end, prior to the 2002 state legislative elections a significant 
number of legislative incumbents chose not to defend their seats. Specific-
ally, four assembly and two senate incumbents chose to seek alternative 
offices instead of run for reelection. An additional four assembly incumbents 
chose to retire instead of run in districts that were drawn in a manner un-
favorable to their reelection goals. In two of these cases, GOP assembly 
incumbents opted not to run in districts into which another incumbent had 
been drawn. Similarly, two Democratic assembly incumbents who had been 
drawn into Republican majority districts (+.9 and +15.6% GOP registration 
advantages) decided to retire instead of compete as minority candidates. In 
addition, four assembly incumbents lost in the primaries. The net result was 
that 14 of the 42 assembly seats and four of the 11 senate seats contested in 
2002 featured no incumbent.15
 The existence of so many open seats in 2002 provided yet another 
opportunity to alter the status quo in the state legislature. Indeed, some ob-
servers felt that the open seats in the senate provided the Democrats with a 
legitimate chance to gain control of the upper chamber and in so doing, oust 
long standing Majority Leader Bill Raggio, who over his career had done 
everything possible to stifle the interests of southern Nevada (Bowers 1996). 
However, after the ballots had been counted, Republicans maintained their 
12 to nine majority in the senate and consistent with the GOP surge in 2002, 
the Democrats lost two seats in the assembly, reducing their majority from 
2517 to 2319. 
 A closer inspection of the results of the 2002 legislative elections 
demonstrate the direct influence that redistricting had on the states electoral 
dynamics. In only three of the 44 contested state legislative races did the 
candidate whose party had a deficit in voter registration win. In one of these 
races a one-term assembly Democratic incumbent lost her seat by 36 votes 
to a three-term GOP incumbent who had been drawn into the district. In the 
second of these contests a Democratic incumbent held her seat despite com-
peting in a district with a GOP registration advantage of 2.91 percent. In the 
third of these races a northern Democratic incumbent lost her seat by 469 
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votes despite a Democratic registration advantage of just over 2 percent. All 
of the open seats races were won by the candidate whose party held the 
registration advantage. 
 To further demonstrate the direct effects of redistricting on the 2002 
state legislative elections Table 4 presents the results of an OLS regression 
analysis for the 44 contested legislative districts.16 The models dependent 
variable is the Democratic share of the two party vote as reported by the 
Nevada Secretary of States Office. The primary independent variable 
(Registration Difference) is the district partisan registration difference used 
above. Dummy variables for Democratic incumbents, open seat contests, 
and assembly races also are included in the model. 
 The results of the analysis are consistent with the above observations. 
Specifically, the r-squared value indicates that over 40 percent of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable can be accounted for by the independent vari-
ables included in the model and the MSE statistic indicates that the model 
does an adequate job in predicting values of the dependent variable. 
 Turning next to the performance of the models independent variables, 
the coefficient and significance for Registration Difference suggest that 
each increase in a partys registration increases its vote share by .5 percent 
above  the  constant. The statistical insignificance  of  Democratic Incumbent 
 
 
Table 4. OLS Analysis of the Affect of Redistricting on the 
2002 Nevada Legislative Races 
 
 
  Coefficient 
 Independent Variable (standard error) 
 
 
 Registration Difference .515** 
  (.191) 
 Democratic Incumbent .467 
  (6.11) 
 Open Seat -9.46* 
  (5.18) 
 Assembly 5.17 
  (3.75) 
 Constant 51.2*** 
  (5.10) 
 
 
 Number of observations 44 
 R-squared .48 
 Adjusted R-squared .42 
 Root MSE 9.79 
 
 *p<.05; **p<.01; **p<.001 one-tailed test 
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suggests that these incumbents are not rewarded with an additional boost in 
the vote. The performance of this variable, however, is not surprising given 
that so many of the districts were drawn with such large partisan registration 
majorities that any advantages that incumbents may enjoy was mitigated by 
the partisan distribution of their districts. The significance and sign of Open 
Seat indicates that Republicans were more likely to do better in those seats 
(in the assembly the GOP won nine of the 14 open seats and three of four of 
the senate open seats). However, given that many of the open seats were 
drawn to offset the loss of districts formally held by northern Republicans, 
the variables performance is consistent with expectations. Finally, the lack 
of significance for Assembly suggests that there is no systematic different in 
voting patterns between senate and assembly races. In sum, the model indi-
cates that the outcomes of the 2002 legislative elections were largely shaped 
by the decisions made during the 2001 redistricting negotiations. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The 2001 redistricting of the Nevada legislature provided an oppor-
tunity to reapportion representation in response to the states tremendous 
population growth and continued concentration in southern Nevada during 
the prior decade. Consistent with these growth patterns, the primary conse-
quence of the 2001 redistricting was an increase in the representation of 
southern Nevada at the expense of northern and rural interests. Also, the 
shift in seats from northern to southern Nevada necessitated that the electoral 
safety of some incumbents be compromised. However, beyond these consid-
erations, the redistricting plan was most notable for its perpetuation of the 
status quo. Indeed, while the plan either directly or indirectly facilitated a 
large number of open seats, the manner in which legislative leaders drew 
seat boundaries decreased the likelihood that the partisan control of either 
chamber would be altereda point affirmed by the outcome of the 2002 
state legislative elections. 
 As such, the machinations that permeated the 2001 legislative redis-
tricting in Nevada were consistent with extant literature indicating the im-
portance of institutional procedures and other formal and informal con-
straints for understanding redistricting outcomes. As suggested by the work 
of Cain (1994), Cox and Katz (1999), McDonald (2004) and others, the split 
partisan control over the redistricting process in Nevada prohibited redis-
tricting architects from implementing a partisan gerrymander. Instead, legis-
lative leaders were forced to compromise on a bipartisan gerrymander that 
preserved the partisan distributions in the senate and assembly. At the same 
time, Perkins refusal to expand the size of the legislature undermined the 
typical byproduct of bipartisan gerrymanders, incumbent protection. Indeed, 
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consistent with the work Gelman and King (1994), it appears that in the case 
of Nevada in 2001 partisan and to a lesser extent geographic considerations 
trumped concerns about incumbent protection and providing representation 
for Nevadas Hispanic community. 
 The analysis also reveals that the peculiarities of Nevadas redistricting 
institutions played important roles in shaping the eventual outcome. As 
detailed above, the ability to expand the size of the legislature added an 
additional and highly contentious dimension to redistricting negotiations that 
became an important bargaining chip that redistricters were able to use to 
obtain their desired side payments. The use of multi-member districts and 
the lack of contiguousness between senate and assembly seats also proved to 
be important mechanisms for protecting senate incumbents. 
 The substantive consequences of the 2001 Nevada redistricting also are 
consistent with prior research on at least three fronts. First, as suggested by 
Gelman and King (1994) and others, the primary effect of redistricting is a 
substantial shaking-up of the political environment. This was certainly the 
case in Nevada where redistricting helped to facilitate a large number of 
open seat races in 2002. At the same time, the outcomes of the 2002 state 
legislative elections reveal that the intentions of the redistricters were ful-
filled as partisan registration differences were the dominant explanatory 
variable of district level voting in the 2002 legislative elections (Kousser 
1996). Moreover, the inability of redistricters to accommodate Hispanics 
during the redistricting process translated into a poor showing for Hispanics 
in 2002. As noted above, Hispanics compromise nearly 20 percent of the 
states population, but after the 2002 state legislative elections held only 5 
percent of the seats and Hispanics failed to win either of the two assembly 
seats with Hispanic populations exceeding 60 percent. 
 Second, the Nevada case is consistent with the equivocation in the lit-
erature (e.g., Cox and Katz 1999) regarding the level of partisan bias under 
bipartisan plans. Specifically, while assembly Democrats continue to exert 
majority control to a degree that exceeds their share of the aggregate vote, 
the 2002 assembly elections suggest that redistricting did not insulate the 
chamber from challenges from the minority party. Consistent with the strong 
showing of Republicans nationwide in 2002, the Republicans were able to 
pick up two seats in the lower chamber. In the senate, the 2002 elections 
served to maintain the GOP advantage at a level consistent with the aggre-
gate vote. 
 Lastly, prior research (e.g., Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 1999) suggests 
that the main casualty of bipartisan gerrymanders is responsiveness. This 
tends to be the case because plans of this type pack voters into legislative 
districts based upon party registration. This formula yields a large number of 
safe seats for each party and few competitive districts. As a consequence, 
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while incumbents do not have to worry about losing in the general election, 
they do need to be concerned with primary challenges from their parties 
fringes. These dynamics, in turn, can create a disincentive for legislators to 
compromise and moderate if doing so is likely to draw an inter-party chal-
lenge. The end result is likely to be increased partisan polarization and grid-
lock and less responsiveness. 
 The debate over a proposed tax increase that dominated the post-
redistricting legislative session provides an example of these processes at 
work. In response to a proposed billion dollar tax increase by Republican 
Governor Kenny Guinn, the state legislature was unable to reach an agree-
ment over the amount of the increase or the entities that would be taxed. 
This stalemate persisted despite agreement among Democrats and Republi-
cans that some increase was needed and polls showing that a majority of 
voters favored increasing government spending, particularly on education.17 
Despite a myriad of proposals and counter-proposals, the debate over taxes 
was not resolved during the regular legislative session or during the first of 
two special sessions. Only after a second special session and judicial inter-
vention by both federal and state courts did the legislature reach a com-
promise. While blame for the impasse was directed at a number of indi-
viduals and interests, certainly the disincentives for moderation and com-
promise that the 2001 redistricting facilitated hindered the ability of legisla-
tures to find common ground and respond to the demands of their 
constituents (Damore 2003). 
 While the short term consequences of the 2001 redistricting largely 
played out as expected, the long-term consequences for Nevadas future are 
less clear. Most notably, as Nevada continues to grow and population gains 
in southern Nevada outpace those in the rest of the seat, the states political 
landscape may be further altered along two dimensions. First, given that 
over 70 percent of all Democrats in Nevada live in southern Nevada and 
assuming that future growth mirrors this trend, Nevada may move from a 
state that leans Republican to one that leans Democratic. Second, projecting 
to 2011, a continuation in the states growth patterns will lead to an even 
greater concentration of southern Nevadas power in the legislature at the 
continued expense of northern and rural interests. Indeed, unless the legisla-
ture expands, rural members will have to represent larger geographic areas, 
while the districts of their southern counterparts will become more plentiful 
and more concentrated. All of this, in turn, should make for an even more 
spirited redistricting debate in 2011. 
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NOTES 
 
 1Another vein of research focuses on the relationship between race and redistricting 
(e.g., Brace, Grofman, and Handley 1987; Bullock 1995; Canon 1999; Cameron, Epstein, 
and OHalloran 1996). However, because the concerns of this literature are tangential to 
this effort, it is not reviewed here. 
 2Gelman and King (1994) further posit that incumbents may be concerned with 
excluding prospective challengers from their districts, insuring that important donors are 
drawn into their districts, and avoiding dislocation of core supporters. Also, while in 
principle incumbents may be supportive of using redistricting to increase the number of 
seats held by co-partisans they may be less willing to do so if such plans compromise 
their individual security. 
 3As Niemi and Jackman (1991) note, it is this very consideration that may cause 
controlling parties, even if they are able to implement partisan gerrymanders, from maxi-
mizing this potential because doing so increases the partys uncertainty of maintaining its 
existing majority over the life of a redistricting plan. 
 4The four races are the 2000 presidential election, the 2000 and 1998 United States 
senate elections, and the 1998 gubernatorial election. 
 5Prior to redistricting, Democrats held a 27 to 15 advantage in the assembly and 
Republicans had a 12 to nine majority in the senate. Assembly members serve for two 
year and state senators serve for four year with half of the senate seats up for election 
every two years. Senate seats contain twice as many citizens as assembly districts. 
 6If redistricting ended up in court, presumably over a dispute about expansion of 
the legislature, Perkins felt that the Democrats would have the upper hand. Specifically, 
Perkins suggested that if it goes to the courts, I think were in a better position than the 
Republicans are, first and foremost, because I dont believe the courts have the authority 
to expand, and secondly because we believe the case law supports this going to the 
(Nevada) Supreme Court rather than federal court(Morrison 2001a). 
 7Game theory models the influence that interdependent decision making and struc-
tural considerations have on the behavior of political actors. Game theory is deductively 
based and operationalized using formal modeling techniques. However, a formal model 
of the negotiations between legislative leaders is not developed here. Rather, the logic of 
game theory and its underlying assumption of rationality are used to structure a descrip-
tive analysis of this process. The rationality assumption posits that actors have goals that 
they attempt to achieve through their actions; that actors choices about how to achieve 
those goals are constrained by the decision making structure; and that actors choose 
actions that they believe will best achieve their goals (Morrow 1994). 
 8Mixed motive games are a type of nonzero-sum game that assumes that players 
payoffs are variable. In contrast, the more ubiquitous zero sum framework assumes that 
what is lost by one player is gained by the other. Although the solutions to nonzero-sum 
games tend to be less compelling than those in zero-sum games, these games provide a 
more realistic representation of complex political situations because they allow players to 
have both competitive and complementary interests (Brams 1975). 
 9More specifically, the redistricting process is conceptualized as a non-cooperative 
game, which does not allow players to make binding agreements. Rather, in non-coopera-
tive games players must enforce any coordination through the game itself. In cooperative 
games, it is easier for players to make agreements because players are able to bind them-
selves to agreements that may not be enforceable. In making this assumption, cooperative 
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games assume away the key questions of when, how, and why players will cooperate for 
their mutual benefit (Morrow 1994). 
 10The assembly redistricting bill (AB 665) apportioned 29 of 42 assembly seats and 
14 of 21 senate seats in Clark County with a majority of seats in both chambers drawn to 
the advantage of Democrats. The plan also created two majority Hispanic assembly seats 
and one majority Hispanic senate seat. Because the plan did not expand the size of the 
legislature, it placed eight assembly and three senate incumbents into the same districts, 
the majority of whom were Republicans. The senate redistricting bill (SB 575) sought to 
offset any loss of seats from northern to southern Nevada by expanding the legislature 
from 63 to 69 seats (46 assembly and 23 senate seats) with a majority of seats in both 
chambers having a pro-GOP bias. In so doing, the plan allowed rural lawmakers to keep 
their seat by creating new districts in southern Nevada. The Republican plan also called 
for three Democratic senate incumbents to compete in a two-member district in Clark 
County and created four assembly districts that forced eight Democratic incumbents to 
compete against one another. 
 11The compromise would expand the senate from 21 to 23 (13 favorable to Repub-
licans and 10 favorable to the Democrats) seats and the assembly from 42 to 46 (29 
Democratic leaning seats and 17 districts favorable to the GOP). The plan also added new 
seats in Clark County, which allowed northern incumbents to keep their seats and sought 
to give Hispanics representation in both chambers (Morrison 2001d). 
 12As a small-government Republican, Raggio did not want to be responsible for 
increasing the size of the legislature (even if doing so would allow him to protect north-
ern incumbents) and he was under pressure from the Republicans in Washington D.C. to 
holdout for a drawing of Nevadas new House seat that would be more favorable to the 
GOP (Morrison 2001d).  
 13The 2001 plan also reduced the number of two-member senate districts from five 
to two. 
 14Consistent with the skullduggery that is a hallmark of redistricting politics, deci-
sions about which incumbents would be sacrificed was not randomly determined. Instead, 
those incumbents who received unfavorable treatment during the redistricting process felt 
that they were being punished for unpopular stands. For example, two northern Nevada 
Republicans, Don Gustavson and Sharron Angle, who were drawn into the districts of 
other incumbents, felt that this decision was directly attributable to their vote against a 
pet project of Senate Majority Leader Bill Raggio. As Gustavson explained, Sharron 
and I got the shaft. We didnt vote for the good old boys, and now they are making it 
tough on us (Ryan 2003). 
 15Four assembly Republicans, one senate Republican, three assembly Democrats, 
and one senate Democrat (competing in a two member district) ran unopposed. The fail-
ure of the opposition party to field candidates in these races suggests that the partys were 
behaving strategically as in all but two of these districts, the party holding the seat held 
registration advantages in excess of 14 percent. Because of the lack of competition for 
these seats, they are not included in the analysis below. 
 16Prior research utilizes a variety of approaches to assess the affect of redistricting 
on electoral outcomes. Unfortunately, as Kousser (1996) discusses, many of these 
approaches are problematic. For instance, the reliability of indirect measures of partisan 
gerrymandering such as compactness is questionable at best. Others measures provide 
little insight into the intentions of redistricters because they employ data not available at 
the time of redistricting (i.e., measures of partisan bias that unfold over the life of a 
redistricting plan). Perhaps the most commonly used indicator to measure the conse-
quences of redistricting, variants of the seats/votes ratio, which examine the relationship 
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between aggregate (statewide) votes and seat totals, are problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, even though legislative seats are allocated based upon population such 
measures rely on votes, which are determined by a variety of factors (i.e., the socio-
economic status of voters, candidates spending, competitiveness, etc.). Second, such 
measures assume that shifts in the aggregate vote should correspond to aggregate shifts in 
the parties shares of seats in a legislature. However, as Kousser notes, small shifts in the 
aggregate do not push an otherwise losing candidate over the threshold of a plurality of 
a district, which is the much more relevant statistic for actual politics (537). In light of 
these concerns, Kousser (1996) argues for using a measure of partisan registration to 
assess the consequences of redistricting. Indeed, using such a measure, he is able to pre-
dict nearly 90 percent of the winners in California assembly and congressional contests 
between 1970 and 1994. Methodologically, such a measure is advantageous for at least 
three reasons: it provides a direct measure of partisan gerrymandering; it utilizes informa-
tion available at the time of redistricting and hence, captures the intent of redistricting 
architects; and by using individual districts as the unit of analysis, the measure eliminates 
the issues involved with aggregation. For these reasons, I utilize a variation of Koussers 
model here. 
 17These same polls also indicated that Nevadans were less supportive of any tax 
increases and instead, preferred to pass the tax burden on to the states nearly forty 
million annual visitors.  
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